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Abstract
Does foreign ownership enhance or decrease a ﬁrm’s chances of
survival? Over the 100 year period 1895-2001 this paper compares
the survival of foreign subsidiaries in Denmark to a control sample
matched by industry and ﬁrm size. We ﬁnd that foreign-owned com-
panies have a higher survival probability. On average exit risk for
domestic companies is 2.3 times higher than for foreign companies.
First movers like Siemens, Philips, Kodak, Ford, GM or Goodyear
have been active in the country for almost a century. Relative foreign
survival increases with company age. However, the foreign survival
advantage appears to be eroded by globalization, it decreases over
time and disappears at the end of the century.
∗Corresponding author: Professor, Ph.D., Center for Corporate Governance, De-
partment of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School,
Porcelænshaven 23 A Building 65, 2000 Copenhagen F, Denmark, Phone +45 38152590,
Fax +45 38152500, E-mail: st.int@cbs.dk
1
1 Introduction
How does foreign ownership aﬀect the survival of companies? Does foreign
ownership generally improve corporate survival chances by resource transfers
from the parent company? Or does it reduce survival because of the liability
of foreignness, internal bureaucracy, lower ﬂexibility or other characteristics
of foreign ownership? While there have been several studies of the survival
of foreign subsidiaries (e.g. Mitchell, Yeung and Shaver, 1994, Shaver, 1995,
1998; Li, 1995; Shaver et al. 1997, 1998, Delios and Beamish 2001, Delios
and Beamish 2004, Dhanaraj and Beamish 2004, Chung and Beamish 2005),
only a few appear to have compared the survival of foreign-owned and do-
mestic companies (Li and Guisinger, 1991, Pennings et al. 1994, Zaheer,
1995, Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997, Mata and Portugal, 2002).
This paper examines the survival of foreign subsidiaries in Denmark over
the past century compared to domestically owned companies (for convenience
we sometimes refer to these companies as ”foreign” and ”domestic” respec-
tively). Using a unique data source (Green’s handbook of Danish Funds
and Stocks), which has published a fairly comprehensive register of compa-
nies operating in Denmark since 1887, the paper is able to track companies
over the 100-year period 1895-2001. Using the same database we are able to
construct a matched sample of domestically owned companies in the same
industry and size classes.
To illustrate the methodology, one of our observations is Ford Motor
Company, which established a European subsidiary in Denmark in 1919
(the second in Europe). This subsidiary which supplied the Nordic and
Baltic markets, Poland and Germany was from the very beginning one of
the largest manufacturing companies in Denmark producing Ford T, Ford
A and later V8 engines such as Anglia as well as tractors. Production was
closed down in 1965, but the company continues as a sales and service oper-
ation. We match Ford with The United Danish Automobile Manufacturers
(De Forenede Danske Automobilfabrikker), a 1918 merger of 3 Danish pro-
ducers, which produced cars, especially trucks and busses (and later motor
trains), until production was closed down in 1957, after which the company
began importing foreign brands (e.g. British Triumph). The company was
closed in 1993. We register this case as evidence that the foreign company
(Ford) survived and survived longer, so far for 81 years (currently 87) com-
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pared to 75 years for the domestic control company.
Analyzing this data set foreign subsidiaries are found have a signiﬁcantly
higher survival probability than domestically owned companies. The diﬀer-
ence between the two groups is numerically large and robust to control for
industry, time period and ﬁrm size.
The paper is organized in the usual way. Section 2 considers the theoret-
ical relationship between domestic/foreign ownership and company survival.
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the statistical results. And
section 5 concludes.
2 Theory and Previous Evidence
The standard theory of the multinational enterprize (Caves 1996, Buckley
and Casson 1976, Dunning 1981, Hennart 1991) proposes that foreign di-
rect investment will occur and be successful when ownership, location and
internalization advantages exceed the costs of establishing and running for-
eign subsidiaries (Dunning, 1981). International business activities can in
principle be conducted without foreign subsidiaries - by international trade
between independent companies, subcontracting of production, licensing etc.
But some companies have competitive (ownership) advantages based on ﬁrm
speciﬁc resources that are most eﬀectively exploited by establishing foreign
production facilities (internalized) within a multinational corporation. Sim-
ilar arguments ﬁgure prominently in the international business literature as
a rationale for establishment of sales subsidiaries rather than independent
distributors (Anderson and Gattignon 1986).
The theory predicts that foreign subsidiaries have performance advan-
tages in industries where ﬁrm speciﬁc resources matter while transaction
costs are high, and several empirical studies have supported this hypothesis
(Caves 1996). The implication is that foreign subsidiaries will have higher
survival rates if their competitive advantage relative to domestic companies
exceeds their added costs of operating in a foreign country.
To the ownership and location advantage arguments we must add the
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possible options-like character of foreign direct investment (Kogut and Kuti-
laka 1994; Mata, 2002). Multinational companies may decide to maintain a
presence in a country despite adverse conditions because foreign subsidiaries
provide them with valuable options for future expansion. This may improve
their survival power relative to that of domestic companies.
Ownership and internalization advantages must be balanced against dis-
advantages of foreign ownership. Hymer (1960) suggested that multinational
companies which establish subsidiaries in a foreign country incur costs be-
cause they lack knowledge of business conditions in the host country and
because of policy discrimination. These costs can be thought of as the ”lia-
bility of foreignness” (Zaheer 1995). If foreign parent companies act under
a veil of ignorance compared to their host country competitors, they are
likely to make more mistakes which could very well result in a higher exit
rate. However, it is not evident that foreignness is necessarily a liability in
all cases. Mata and Portugal (2002) argue that controlling for the liability
of newness new foreign subsidiaries have better survival chances than new
domestic ventures because they can draw on the expertise, experience and le-
gitimacy of the parent company. Brannen (2004) documents that foreignness
was advantage in for Disneyland Tokyo and suggests that foreign ﬁrms may
to some extent recontextualise their operations to achieve a better semantic
ﬁt with the host country environment.
In addition, the corporate governance of domestic companies diﬀers sys-
tematically from that of foreign subsidiaries. Standard agency theory (Jensen
and Meckling 1976) predicts that the weight attached to managerial goals
(such as size, growth and survival) relative to proﬁtability will decrease with
ownership concentration, and foreign parent companies tend to be strong,
well-informed owners with high ownership stakes. Boardman et al. (1996)
point to the agency argument as a possible explanation for superior prof-
itability in foreign-owned companies. Agency concerns could also lead to a
home country preference and discrimination against foreign entities. Closing
down or selling oﬀ foreign entities may be easier than closing down or selling
of entities close to the home oﬃce (including of course the top managersown
job). Moreover, home country stakeholders may be more inﬂuential com-
pared to host country stakeholders. The implication is that companies may
adopt a more instrumental view of foreign subsidiaries, which are therefore
more likely to be closed down if they do not contribute to shareholder value
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or survival of the parent company.
Altogether, we expect the relative survival rates of foreign and domestic
companies to depend on a balance of ownership and internalization advan-
tages against the liability of foreignness and possible home country bias.
As for empirical studies, there have to our knowledge been remarkably
few.
Li and Guisinger (1991) conducted the ﬁrst systematic study comparing
the failures of foreign and domestically controlled ﬁrms in the US and laid
the ground for subsequent work by developing many of the basic ideas. They
gathered data on business failures of foreign-controlled ﬁrms (n=85) relative
to aggregate statistics on the number of foreign subsidiaries and compared
these ﬁgures to domestic failure rates as calculated by Dun and Bradstreet.
The comparison revealed that foreign ﬁrms had much lower failure rates,
non-ﬁnancial domestic ﬁrms failed more than 8 times more frequently and do-
mestic manufacturing ﬁrms failed almost 4 times as frequently as the foreign
companies. They interpreted the survival advantage of foreign companies
as an indication of ownership advantages as proposed by Dunning (1981).
However, given the nature of their data set they were unable to do con-
trolled, multivariate tests, although they did observe that the foreign ﬁrms
tended to be smaller than the domestic benchmark ﬁrms, which indicated
that the survival diﬀerences were not attributable to size eﬀects. Moreover,
it seems natural to inquire whether the low observed failure rates of multi-
national subsidiaries are attributable to their deﬁnition of ”failure” (outright
bankruptcy or exits involving creditor losses), since foreign multinationals
may prefer to close down production in an orderly way rather than risking
damage to their reputation by letting subsidiaries go bankrupt as the authors
themselves mention (Li and Guisinger p. 215-216). Finally, it is not clear
that ﬁndings from the US will necessarily generalize to other markets. The
US is a large, strategic market (which could make foreign parents reluctant
to close down subsidiaries because of their option value).
Pennings, Barkema and Douma (1994) reported that 462 ”expansions” of
large Dutch multinationals failed more often if they were international than
if they were domestic. This was established statistically after controlling
for mode of expansion (acquisition vs. greenﬁeld), relatedness, experience,
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return on capital and size of the expansion. However, the location eﬀect
became insigniﬁcant when controlling for ﬁrm and period eﬀects. A main
contribution of this study is that it analyzed survival from a parent company
viewpoint: foreign subsidiaries were compared to domestic subsidiaries and
not to independent companies which could be parent companies themselves.
In this way the eﬀect of ”foreignness” can be distinguished from the eﬀect of
being a subsidiary. Another positive feature is the sampling of new ventures
which implicitly controls for the liability of newness (Hannan and Carroll
1992, Stinchcombe, 1965). However, both of these strengths also involve
limitations. For example, from a policy and strategy viewpoint the relevant
choice may be between continuation of a domestic company as an indepen-
dent ownership unit and being acquired by a foreign multinational, which
involves simultaneous changes to subsidiary status and to international own-
ership. Moreover, there may be a diﬀerence between the long and short term
evolution of foreign subsidiaries, a point which is emphasized and analyzed
in this paper.
Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) examined the survival rates of 2667 foreign
exchange trading rooms from 65 diﬀerent countries over the 20 year period
1974-1993. They found that foreign trading rooms have higher exit rates,
particularly in the ﬁrst 10-15 years after entry. For example, they indicated
that the exit rate of the foreign trading rooms is 0.005 greater than that
of their domestically owned counterparts. They interpreted this as evidence
of the ”liability of foreignness” following a previous study by Zaheer (1995),
who estimated that proﬁts per trader were higher in domestic trading rooms.
However, for trading rooms with more than 10 years of tenure they found
that the diﬀerence was reduced to 0.002. In other words the the liability of
foreignness was found to decrease with tenure - for example because the for-
eign ﬁrm learns more about the host country or is better integrated in host
country business networks as its tenure and experience increases. Moreover,
they ﬁnd that exit rates of domestic trading rooms increase in the last part
of the period which they see as an eﬀect of ﬁnancial deregulation.
This impressive study goes a long way to analyze and establish the li-
ability of foreignness as an important factor shaping the competitiveness
and survival of foreign subsidiaries. Revisiting the data it is clear however
that the overall diﬀerence in exit rates is small: the exit rate is 42,1 per
cent (710/1700)for foreign trading rooms against 41,8 percent (407/967)for
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domestic trading rooms. In fact the data indicates a reversal in relative sur-
vival rates after year 15 to the advantage of the foreign trading rooms. The
comparative long run survival is still open to question, therefore. Moreover,
while currency trading is a great industry for isolating the liability of foreign-
ness, it clearly supplies a highly standardized commodity for which ownership
advantages may be less easy to establish and defend than in more opaque
and innovative businesses. It is not clear, therefore, that ﬁndings from this
industry generalize to manufacturing industries like pharmaceuticals, chem-
icals or electronics which harbor the generic multinational companies.
Thomsen (2000) studied foreign subsidiaries in Denmark (1895-1995),
which had lower survival probability than a control group composed of the
largest domestically owned manufacturing companies. The diﬀerence was
signiﬁcant and robust to control for size and industry eﬀects, but not cap-
ital structure. Domestically owned companies had higher equity reserves
(equity/assets ratios), which had a positive impact on survival. For given
equity asset ratios there were no signiﬁcant survival diﬀerences. A main con-
tribution of this study is to point to diﬀerences in corporate governance as
a possible source of diﬀerential survival and the use of capital structure as
a proxy for these diﬀerences. In addition the long time span is particularly
interesting raising the the prospect that multinational ownership may have
an adverse long run eﬀect. We therefore build on this unique dataset in the
present paper. However, we believe that comparing foreign subsidiaries with
the largest domestic manufacturing companies may not be the best research
strategy given the heterogeneity of the two samples. We therefore collected
another control group matched by size and industry.
Mata and Portugal (2002) compared the survival of newly established
ﬁrms in Portugal over the period 1983-1989. The 613 foreign-owned entrants
had higher survival rates than a control group of domestically-owned compa-
nies, but the survival diﬀerential disappeared when controlling for workforce
education, ﬁrm size, legal structure, age and industry variables (growth, en-
try barriers, concentration etc.). These results for new entries are particu-
lary interesting given that Zaheer and Mosakowski argued that new foreign
entrants suﬀer from a liability of foreignness distinct from the liability of
newness (Hannan and Carroll 1992, Stinchcombe, 1965). Their data did
not allow them to trace subsequent long-term survival rates of foreign sub-
sidiaries which could be be higher if the liability of foreignness is reduced
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with the age of the company. Moreover, the application to a non-US setting
is interesting because smaller national markets like Portugal presumably are
less strategically important, i.e. carry a smaller option value in the sense of
Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994)
Related literature has provided additional evidence on the liability of for-
eignness. Miller and Parkhe(2002) measured it by x-eﬃciency (failure to
reach the production possibility frontier) and found higher x-ineﬃciency in
foreign-owned banks. Mezias (2002) found that foreign subsidiaries in the US
face more labor lawsuits than domestic ﬁrms. In contrast, Nachum (2003)
found higher rates of return among foreign ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the city of Lon-
don. She attributed this to advantages of multinationality in international
ﬁnancial services, particularly lower information costs, and a lack of home
based advantages. Brannen (2004) found foreignness to be a liability for Dis-
neyland Paris, but an advantage for Disneyland Tokyo.
Overall, the relative survival of foreign subsidiaries is theoretically de-
termined by a balance of beneﬁts and costs of foreignness. The classical
literature on multinational enterprises tends to focus on the beneﬁts which
is quite natural given that its prime goal is to explain the massive increase
in the volume and stock of foreign direct investment over the past decades
(Caves, 1996). Despite an improved understanding of the costs of foreign-
ness we see no compelling reason to deviate from the a priori assumption of a
multinational performance advantage in the present paper. On the contrary,
we will argue that multinational companies posses an important real option
compared to domestic companies: the option not to invest (a defer option in
the sense of Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). We expect multinational companies
to weigh the costs and beneﬁts of foreign direct investment in a speciﬁc coun-
try before they invest and to select only investments for which the expected
beneﬁts exceed the costs. This late mover advantage relative to domestic
companies (not be confused with a ﬁrst mover advantage relative to other
subsidiaries) is a consequence of the observation (veriﬁed in the following)
that multinationals tend to enter after domestic companies.
Admittedly, it is possible to this of exceptions to this scenario. For exam-
ple it may be that foreign companies have to establish subsidiaries despite
information disadvantages (ignorance of the host country environment) and
so have to accept higher failure risk despite possibly higher expected returns.
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However, the reverse may also very well be true: multinationals may have
better knowledge of industry conditions before they invest which would im-
ply lower expected risk of failure. To be sure there may be industries (like
currency exchange) in which the advantages of multinationality are smaller,
but we expect to see fewer foreign subsidiaries in those very industries. It
is even possible that multinational companies overinvest because of agency
problems. But even with a limited amount of capital market eﬃciency over-
investment of this kind is unlikely to persist over very long periods of time
such as (in this case) a century.
We therefore propose what we believe to be the classical a priory hypoth-
esis for empirical testing:
Hypothesis 1. Foreign subsidiaries are likely to have a higher survival
probability than domestically owned companies.
However we expect this main eﬀect to be moderated by a number of vari-
ables that inﬂuence the balance of costs and beneﬁts of foreignness.
Company size eﬀects are emphasized by Caves (1998). Jovanovic (1982)
and Aggarwal and Gort (1999) present theoretical arguments for a positive
size eﬀect on survival because of eﬃciency and selection eﬀects (Jovanovic
1982), a larger investment commitment (Caves 1998), higher sunk costs (Ag-
garwal and Gort 1999) and lower sensitivity to risk and large shocks (Han-
nah 1999). Empirical support for a positive eﬀect of company size on sur-
vival is found by Mata et al. (1995), Audretch and Mahmood (1995), Caves
(1998), Aggarwal and Gort (1999). We control for subsidiary size eﬀects by
a matched sample design and test the robustness of our results by including
it as control variable. While size is important to both foreign and domestic
companies we do not have any strong prediction about the eﬀect of subsidiary
size on their relative survival.
However, size eﬀects could also occur at the parent company level. In
general the multinational parent companies of foreign subsidiaries in a small
nation are likely to be much larger than domestic companies. So if parent
company size eﬀects were important, one would expect foreign subsidiaries to
have a higher survival frequency. We cannot directly observe parent company
size, but we can examine a speciﬁc size-related advantage of multinationality
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which is emphasized in the literature: better access to and lower costs of
capital. We would expect this to show up in a lower risk of bankruptcy (c.f.
Li and Guisinger 1991), which of course only occurs when a corporation is
unable to repay its debt. Admittedly, it is legally possible for foreign parent
companies to hide behind ”the veil of the corporation” and let subsidiaries
in foreign countries go bankrupt (Ferran, 1998). But we believe that there
are immaterial costs of bankruptcy (e.g. reputation risks) which make them
choose bankruptcy as a last resort. For example, bankruptcy may damage
the brand name of the parent company and so create barriers to sales and
marketing in the future. Moreover bad reputation may spill over to over host
countries and increase the costs of doing business there.
Industry eﬀects are emphasized by Aggarwal and Gort (1999). Theo-
retically, industry eﬀects can be caused by a number of factors. The level of
competition, the predictability of demand and the rate and form of techno-
logical change all vary across industries and aﬀect the probability of survival
(Aggarwal and Gort 1999 p. 3). Industries may be at diﬀerent stages of the
industry life cycle (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994, Klepper 1996) with low
survival rates in shake-out periods (early and later). Generally, high-tech in-
dustries may have higher rates of technological obsolescence (Aggarwal and
Gort 1999). The theory of the multinational enterprise predicts that the
frequency of foreign subsidiaries is higher in industries characterized by own-
ership, location and internalization advantages (Dunning 1981). Empirically,
several studies ﬁnd that multinational subsidiaries do tend to cluster in cer-
tain industries (e.g. Caves, 1988, Thomsen and Pedersen 1998). A priori
we expect foreign subsidiaries to have higher survival rates in these scale
and scope intensive industries with ﬁrst mover and integration advantages
(Chandler 1990), whereas their survival rates would tend to be lower in the
traditional industries where small-scale production is still the rule and ﬂexi-
bility is a key to success.
Time period. We expect relative survival rates to change substantially
over a 100 year period during which there have been large changes in policy
regimes, economic conditions and technology which are known to have inﬂu-
enced trade policies (e.g. protectionism, barriers to international investment)
and internationalization. We follow Geoﬀrey Jones (2005 p. 20) in distin-
guishing between diﬀerent periods in the history of multinational enterprise.
Phase one ”the ﬁrst global economy” covers the period 1880-1929, that is the
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free trade period prior to 1914 and the continuing liberal trade regime in the
1920s. Phase 2 ”disintegration” covers the years of protectionism and war
1930-150 and the beginnings of the new global economy 1950-1979. Phase 3
is the new global economy 1979- and on.
Abstracting from these enormous policy shocks, there may be a down-
ward trend in the liability of foreignness as a consequence of better access
to information, reduced language barriers, lower transportation costs, more
eﬃcient distribution channels and the like. However, the advantages of for-
eignness have probably also been aﬀected. Increasing internationalization of
domestic ﬁrms and competition among foreign subsidiaries could also mean
that advantages of foreign ownership are reduced over time. For example, it
has to an increasing extent become possible to service a host country market
by exporting from a subsidiary in another country.
Company Age is likely to inﬂuence learning (information costs) and
reputation (legitimacy). If foreign companies are by deﬁnition late movers,
their survival chances could be negatively aﬀected. However, as with size,
the age and experience of the parent company may be important as well.
Following Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) we expect the relative survival of
foreign companies to increase with subsidiary age as they learn more about
their new environment and become more integrated in host country networks.
Other variables. A number of other variables are likely to inﬂuence
ﬁrm survival. Variables like knowledge stock, R&D intensity, brand capital
etc. could inﬂuence survival rates, but cannot be measured empirically over
a long period of time. Instead we rely on a twin study (matched sample)
methodology: by matching foreign subsidiaries with companies in the same
industry and size class and studying their relative survival we hope to control
for unobservable heterogeneity and to be able to identify the eﬀects of foreign
ownership.
3 Sampling method
This paper uses the data set on foreign subsidiaries gathered by Thomsen
(2000), but instead of comparing them to the largest domestically owned
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manufacturing companies we collected a matched sample based on industry
and company size. In addition to an improved methodology we updated the
data set by a follow up study in 2001. We were also able to add information
on the causes of exit in the last part of the period.
Denmark is a small European country (EU member) of 5 million people
(comparable to Minnesota) and a per capita gross national income of 40650
US dollars compared to US average 41400 US dollars (World Bank, 2005).
Despite a large welfare state the level of government intervention in the pri-
vat sector is very limited and the economy is very open to international trade
and investment (Exports constitute some 45Export.Gov (the US government
export portal) describes the Nordic region (Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden) as ”an attractive and lucrative market for U.S. companies, as well
as an important trading partner to the United States. Its 24 million con-
sumers are looking for high-quality and reputable products from abroad, and
are receptive to U.S. products and services. ... The Nordic countries are
among the world’s wealthiest countries. The region is dynamic, highly so-
phisticated and very competitive, with stable political and economic climate.
English is widely spoken and commonly used in the business environment
making the market easy to enter for U.S. companies. American high quality
products and services as well as state-of-the-art technology are well received.”
The data set for this paper covers the period 1895 to 2001 and is based
on a Danish company register (Greens Danske Fonds og Aktier) which has
been published since 1887 and covers a broad range of companies operating
in Denmark, though with a clear focus on joint stock companies, particularly
the larger ones, and with improved coverage over time. The sampling design
is as follows: All foreign-owned manufacturing companies registered in the
years 1895, 1907, 1915, 1925, 1934, 1946, 1956, 1964, 1975, 1985, 1995 were
sampled. Based on registered share capital and industry we found a match-
ing domestic company recorded in the registry in the same year. Hereby, 533
foreign-owned and 528 matching domestic-owned companies were identiﬁed.
In this way our database consists of 528 pairs of companies which at entry
were matched on industry and share capital as closely as possible.
For example, of the more well known international companies, we match
Kodak with a local producer (Nordisk Kamerafabrik) which turned out to
exit quickly (just one observation in 1915), whereas Kodak Denmark is still
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Figure 1: Inﬂation Adjusted Share Capital for Siemens and the Danish Con-
trol Firm.
active today. American Tobacco Company (entry 1901) is matched with the
Danish Cigar and Tobacco Factories (now Scandinavian Tobacco). Contrary
to the general trend this company outlived American Tobacco despite the lack
of domestic tobacco production (eventually the Danish company acquired its
competitor). United Shoe Machinery Company (entry 1909, exit after 1956)
was matched with Julius Larsen Footwear Machinery (which exited during
the depression following 1929). Citroen (entry with distribution only in 1924)
was matched with a domestic distribution company (Scandinavian Motor).
The evolution of Siemens and its match is given in Figure 1 to illustrate
the approach. Note that the match is not perfect since Siemens is somewhat
larger than the control company. Over time Siemens has expanded steadily
(even despite general expropriation policies after the second world war when
Denmark was liberated from German Occupation), while the control com-
pany exited already in the 1930s.
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The general pattern is that many of the foreign subsidiaries have been
in Denmark for almost a century. This is true of Asea (entry 1925) Dunlop
(1914), Gilette (1919), Goodyear (1925), Philips (also 1925). There can be
no doubt that these companies have signiﬁcant staying power.
There have been two major waves in the establishment of foreign sub-
sidiaries in Denmark, 1915-34 and 1964-1995. In particular, there was a
virtual explosion of subsidiary creation during the 1970s and 1980s. The
majority (84.5%) of the companies enter the study after 1970.
After entering the database the companies were tracked in each of the
above sampling years with a follow-up in 2001. We recorded the evolution
of the company in terms of share capital, assets, industry, and if possible
the actual year of exit. The company register also provided information on
establishment year and thereby company age.
The ability to track companies over a century is a major advantage of our
study compared to previous research, but it does imply certain limitations
on data availability, particularly early in the period. For example, we may
be able to observe that a certain company is active at some point in time,
but has disappeared in the next period without knowing precisely what hap-
pened to it. Naturally, we cross-checked our data source for possible name
changes, mistaken omissions, information about mergers etc., but in some
cases we were unable to verify what happened. Our ”exit” event therefore is
not synonymous with ”liquidation” or death, but includes exit by merger into
a larger entity (if the company disappears as an independent unit). More-
over, although we did try to account for this, a company may in some cases
survive as a corporate entity (owning property or a bank account) while ac-
tual business operations have ceased.
Secondly, the available accounting information is in some cases limited,
particularly for smaller companies early in the period. At the minimum we
have access to year of establishment, industry and share capital.
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4 Descriptive statistics
A ﬁrst look at the data, without taking the matching or the external variables
into account, indicates a marginally higher exit risk for domestic companies
(Table 1). At the end of follow-up period 356 (67%) domestic companies and
389 (74%) foreign subsidiaries were still operating while the remaining 172
(33%) domestic and 139 (26%) foreign subsidiaries had ceased their activities
before 2001. In other words, at ﬁrst glance the exit rates seem to be lower
for the foreign subsidiaries and foreign ﬁrms seem have higher survival power
in support of hypothesis 1.
Ownership No. of exits No. of survivors Total
Domestic 172 (32.6%) 356 (67.4%) 528 (100%)
Foreign 139 (26.3%) 389 (73.7%) 528 (100%)
Total 311 (29.5%) 745 (70.5%) 1056 (100%)
Table 1. Exit rates for domestically owned and foreign subsidiaries
In table 2 we break down the exits by type. Overall, the diﬀerences seem
small. For example, the fraction of foreign and domestic ﬁrms exiting by
mergers and acquisitions is identical. However, the bankruptcy frequency -
though as low as a few percent for both kinds of ﬁrms - is 4 times higher
for domestically owned ﬁrms (3.97%) than for foreign subsidiaries (0.95%).
Apparently, foreign parent companies prefer to avoid bankruptcies and have
the ﬁnancial strength to carry on.
Cause Domestic Foreign Total
Merger etc 57 (10.8%) 57 (10.8%) 114 (10.8%)
Liquidated 12 (2.3%) 11 (2.1%) 23 (2.2%)
Bankrupted 21 (4.0%) 5 (0.9%) 26 (2.5%)
Empty 9 (1.7%) 5 (0.9%) 14 (1.3%)
Unknown 73 (13.8%) 61 (11.6%) 134 (12.7%)
Censored 356 (67.4%) 389 (73.7%) 745 (70.5%)
Total 528 (100.0%) 528 (100.0%) 1056 (100.0%)
Table 2. Exit causes for domestically owned companies and foreign
subsidiaries
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The matching strategy succeeded with respect to industries. Table 3
demonstrates that food, chemicals and metal products are the main indus-
tries in which foreign subsidiaries are active. This agrees with previous stud-
ies (Caves, 1996, Chandler 1988) which ﬁnd that multinationals are partic-
ularly active in industries characterized by (multi-ﬁrm) economies of scale
and scope.
Industry
code
Main Industry No. of
Companies
31 Food, drink, tobacco 59 (11.2%)
32 Textiles 12 ( 2.3%)
33 Wood, furniture 11 ( 2.1%)
34 Paper, printing, publishing 28 ( 5.3%)
35 Chemicals 130 (24.6%)
36 Materials (glass, concrete, ceramics) 12 ( 2.3%)
37 Minerals 6 ( 1.1%)
38 Metals, Machinery, Electrical products 244 (46.2%)
39 Other manufacturing 26 ( 4.6%)
Total 528 (100%)
Table 3. The paired sample by main industry.
Our preferred size measure is share capital. This is both because it is
always available and because of endogeneity problems with measures that
reﬂect the relative success of the company. Companies that are not compet-
itive are more likely to experience cutbacks and size reductions and then to
exit, but it would be wrong to interpret this a negative eﬀect of company size
on exit rates. In contrast the (inﬂation adjusted) share capital reﬂects the
size of the funds that are ex ante invested in the company before its relative
ﬁtness is tested in practice.
It was not possible to ﬁnd exact matches according to company size cap-
ital, but as seen in Figure 2, the overall picture is that the share capital
roughly coincides for matched companies.
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Figure 2: Share capital at entry - logarithmic scale.
5 Statistical Methods
The statistical analyses are based on the proportional hazards model for anal-
ysis of censored survival data as proposed by Cox (1972,1975). Diﬀerently
from the ’standard’ proportional hazards model companies do not enter the
study at the same age, and to avoid problems with length biased sampling,
each company only contributes to the partial likelihood from the age of enter-
ing into the study - that is, the observations are considered as left truncated.
To account for the matched design a stratiﬁed proportional hazards model
is used (see eg. Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 1980, 2002). In this model, the haz-
ard function λij(t) for the i’th company (domestic and foreign, respectively)
in the j’th pair of companies is speciﬁed according to the proportional hazards
model, such that
λij(t) = λ0j(t)e
β�Xij , i = 1, 2, j = 1, .., N, (1)
where λ0j(t)’s are the unknown baseline hazard for the j’th pair of companies.
Xij is the vector of covariates and β the unknown regression parameters.
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Alternatively, the model can be formulated as
λ1j(t) = λ2j(t)e
β�(X1j−X2j), j = 1, ..., N,
Results will be given in terms of relative risks of exit for domestic compared
λ1j(t)to foreign companies,
λ2j(t)
= exp(β�(X1j −X2j)). A relative risk larger than
one means that the risk of exit is larger for domestic owned companies than
for foreign subsidiaries. The tests for matched pairs rely on intrapair com-
parisons alone. Only pairs of companies where one of the companies close
down before either closing or censoring of the other contributes to the test
statistics and consequently the eﬀective sample size can occasionally be small.
Accordingly, the precision of the estimated coeﬃcients may be weakened as
well as the power of hypothesis tests.
Within the above model it is not possible to estimate eﬀects of covari-
ates with constant values within matched pairs of companies (nested eﬀects).
However, it is possible to calculate test statistics for comparison of relative
risks for groups of pairs by including interaction terms and hereby evaluat-
ing the inﬂuence of e.g. year of entry and industry. For this purpose we
have used likelihood-ratio test statistics, -2logLR, which are evaluated in the
approximating χ2 distribution.
6 Results
The standard marginal Kaplan-Meier survival curves for both categories are
seen in Figure 3, which portrays the estimated survival probability as a func-
tion of ﬁrm age. The two ownership categories seem to have very similar
survival rates for the ﬁrst 20 years of age but foreign subsidiaries have greater
staying power between 20 and 100 years of age. This is contrary to the idea
that domestic companies have an advantage in the ﬁrst period because of
greater familiarity with the institutional environment. But higher survival
rates for older international ﬁrms could indicate that the costs of foreignness
decrease with the age and experience of the company. It has to be stressed,
however, that due to the matched design, the survival curve drawn for the
domestic ﬁrms not is representative for the entire population of domestic
companies.
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Figure 3: Marginal Kaplan-Meier survival curves for domestically owned
companies and foreign subsidiaries
Overall, the domestic companies have a higher exit risk. The estimated
relative risk is 1.52 (95% conﬁdence limits: (1.21, 1.90)), and the usual score
test for comparison of the two survival curves results in a test statistic equal
to 13.4 which with one degree of freedom corresponds to p=0.02%. However,
neither the above estimate of the relative risk nor the test statistic utilize
the matched design.
Taking the matching into account by applying model (1) the overall rel-
ative risk of exit is increased to 2.31 (95% conﬁdence limits: (1.56, 3.44))
and the score test becomes highly signiﬁcant, p<0.00% (see Table 5). The
wide conﬁdence limits for the relative risk are attributable to the fact that
the ’eﬀective’ sample size when analyzing the stratiﬁed model is reduced to
246 pairs of companies with at least one exit.
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Analysis of Model (1)
Overall comparison of risk
No. of pairs
-2logLR test,
df, p -value
Relative Risk
(95% conﬁdence limits)
Foreign vs domestic 528 (246) 18.8, 1, <0.00% 2.31 (1.56, 3.44)
Comparison of risk within groups
Main Industry
Food
Chemical
Metal
Other
59 (31)
130 (64)
244 (113)
95 (38)
0.09, 1, 76.3%
11.6, 1, 0.1%
10.9, 1, 0.1%
0.25, 1, 61.7%
1.20 (0.21, 6.77)
4.00 (1.64, 9.81)
2.47 (1.41, 4.33)
1.29 (0.28, 5.91)
Year of Entry
1895-1925
1934-1956
1964-1975
1985
1995
42 (38)
33 (28)
58 (39)
107 (51)
288 (90)
4.08, 1, 4.4%
18.3, 1, 0.0%
4.44, 1, 3.5%
1.84, 1, 17.5%
0.09, 1, 76.3%
2.0 (1.00, 4.00)
10.5 (2.45, 44.7)
2.8 (1.01, 7.78)
1.7 (0.78, 3.71)
0.83 (0.25, 2.73)
Calendar-period
1895-1929
1930-1949
1950-1969
1970-2001
42 (7)
60 (27)
53 (9)
484 (203)
3.96, 1, 4.6%
9.64, 1, 0.2%
2.09, 1, 14.8%
6.13, 1, 1.3%
6.00 (0.72, 49.7)
4.48 (1.62, 13.2)
3.00 (0.91, 22.2)
1.81 (1.12, 2.92)
Test statistics and p-values for
inﬂuence on relative risks
Share Capital
Main Industry
Year of Entry
Calendar-period
0.37, 1, 54.3%
4.09, 3, 25.2%
10.0, 4, 4.0%
10.4, 3, 1.6%
Table 4. No. of pairs of companies and (in brackets) pairs with at least one
exit, likelihood ratio test statistics (-2logLR), degrees of freedom (df) and
corresponding signiﬁcance values for comparison of exit risks for domestically
owned companies and foreign subsidiaries by use of model (1). Further, the
estimated relative exit risk (domestic/foreign) is shown together with the
estimated 95% conﬁdence limits.
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The results of estimates by model (1) are seen in Table 4. Analysis of
models with simultaneous inclusion of several factors are in general not re-
ported, but is limited to few relevant cases, as the eﬀective sample size in
general is too small to perform reliable estimates and test statistics. As
seen from the table, analysis of possible interaction between ﬁrm size and
ownership showed no signiﬁcant eﬀect of ﬁrm size measured by the logs of
the inﬂation-adjusted share capital, p=54.3%. Further, the relative risk of
exit for domestic compared to foreign companies was studied within industry
groups. Given the matched design and the relatively small eﬀective number
of companies, the analysis of diﬀerences between industry groups was per-
formed on aggregated industry level (Table 5). It appears that exit rates for
domestic owned companies are higher in the chemical industries (estimated
relative risk of 4) and metal industries (estimated relative risk 2.47) than in
food and other industries. However, the diﬀerences are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant (p=25.2%). The size eﬀect (of inﬂation-adjusted share capital) also
turned out to be insigniﬁcant within the main industries (-2logLR=3.90,
df=3, p=72.8%).
Next, in the same table, we report the relative risk as a function of year
of entry. We ﬁnd a bell-shaped curve over the last century. From a value of
2.0 on average for the ﬁrst 3 decades, domestic relative exit risk increased to
around 10 in the 1930s-1950s, but has since dropped steadily to a point where
domestic ﬁrms now have lower exit risk than foreign companies (relative exit
risk). The overall diﬀerences in relative risks between calendar periods was
found to be slightly signiﬁcant, p=4.0%. A likely explanation is that the
exit rate is a function of the level of entry by foreign subsidiaries, which was
quite high in the period before the ﬁrst world war, but then decreased in
the interwar period as function of protectionism during the 1930s, the war
economy (1940s) and the subsequent rationing period (1950s). Since glob-
alization has not progressed continuously over the last century, the relative
exit has evolved with the economic fundamentals rather than the time trend.
As also seen in Table 4 foreign companies which enter in recent years
(1985 and 1995) do not have signiﬁcantly higher survival rates than domes-
tic companies, whereas foreign companies entering earlier had signiﬁcantly
higher survival rates than domestic companies.
To examine potential calendar time eﬀects, the relative risk was esti-
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mated within four time-periods. In each period, the risk-set consists of pairs
of companies where both are active in the beginning of the calendar-period
and those surviving the calendar period are considered censored at the end
of the period. In this way some companies may be in the risk set for sev-
eral periods. However, the estimates of the relative risks are not aﬀected
by pairs of companies where both survive a given calendar-time period and
consequently it is possible to compare the calendar speciﬁc relative risks. As
seen in Table 5 the calendar speciﬁc relative risks are found to diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly, (p=1.6%). Due to the low eﬀective number of pairs of companies the
estimated precision of the relative risks is low, specially in the periods ’1895-
1929’ and ’1950-1969’ and these have to be interpreted cautiously. However,
there is a clear tendency to smaller diﬀerences in exit risk of foreign versus
domestic companies. In ’1970-2001’ the relative risk has dropped to 1.81
(1.12, 2.92). In this period, neither diﬀerences in inﬂation-adjusted share
capital nor main industry have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on survival after ad-
justing for ownership (Share capital: -2logLR=0.028, df=1, p=86.6%; Main
industry: -2logLR=0.324, df=3, p=95.5%).
Due to the low precision in ’ 1895-1929’ and ’ 1950-1969’ comparison of
the periods has been restricted to ’1930-1949’ and ’1970-2001’. Compari-
son of the relative risks in these two periods shows that the diﬀerence is
insigniﬁcant (-2logLR=2.56 , df=1, p=10.9%). However, as seen in Figure
4. domestic companies tend to exit more rapidly than foreign subsidiaries in
the inter- and after-war period, while the relative risk is much lower in more
recent years.
Excluding bankruptcies from the analysis does not qualitatively alter the
results. The overall relative exit risk decreases to 2.12 (1.37, 3.12) and is
still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one (p=0.03%). Similarly to the analyses
based on the full data set, neither Share capital nor Main industry have a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the relative exit risk, whereas both Year of entry and
Calendar-period aﬀects the relative exit risks signiﬁcantly. The general pic-
ture of the estimated relative risks within groups are almost unaltered, but
the estimated risk ratios are slightly lowered.
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier survival curves for domestic- resp. foreign-owned
companies in time periods ’1930-1949’ and ’1950-1969’ respectively.
Discussion
To sum up, we ﬁnd that domestic companies have a signiﬁcantly higher exit
rate than foreign subsidiaries. Thus our main hypothesis is supported. The
overall estimate of the relative risk of exit is 2.31 in favor of foreign sub-
sidiaries. Apparently, the beneﬁts of foreign ownership including access to
capital, brands, knowledge and other resources from the parent company out-
weigh the costs of foreignness. However, the foreign survival advantage de-
creases over time and becomes insigniﬁcant at the end of period which seems
to imply that the gains to foreignness have been eroded over time (as also
observed by Nachum, 2003). Since the decreasing survival premium coincides
with an increase in the number of foreign subsidiaries, one possible explana-
tion seems to be that increasing competition among foreign subsidiaries and
a more internationally competitive domestic sector have gradually reduced
the comparative advantage of foreign ﬁrms. This is also consistent with par-
ticularly high relative survival rates for the relatively few foreign subsidiaries
which entered in the protectionist period period 1934-1956.
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Compared to previous work our study diﬀers by taking a long run per-
spective, by the twin study methodology and by examining a small country
setting. Because of the long-run nature of the dataset we are able to doc-
ument that the relative survival of foreign subsidiaries is dependent on the
historical context and not just in the intuitive way that more international
openness implies better survival.
Since we ﬁnd insigniﬁcant diﬀerences at the end of the period, our results
are consistent with Mata and Portugal (2002), who also examined a small
country setting and found no survival diﬀerences between foreign and domes-
tic companies after controlling for the inﬂuence of other relevant variables.
Like Mata and Portugal we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant survival diﬀerences in the ﬁrst
decade after entry.
Compared to Zaheer and Mosakowski(1997) we ﬁnd no indication that
the foreign subsidiaries in our sample start oﬀ with a liability of foreignness,
but as indicated we do ﬁnd that their survival chances improve the older
they get, for example because of learning and increasing legitimacy in the
host country environment. Some of them appear to have become regular
pillars of society with greater seniority than most domestic ﬁrms. We con-
jecture that the sample industry - currency trading - used by Zaheer and
Mosakowski(1997)is ideal for isolating the eﬀects of the liability of foreign-
ness because of the standardized and transparent nature of the product, but
tends to neutralize ﬁrm speciﬁc advantages, which bring about the classical
ownership and internalization advantages of multinational companies.
Compared to Thomsen (2000), who found a negative survival eﬀect of
foreign ownership, we ﬁnd the opposite result. We attribute the diﬀerence
to the choice of control group. Thomsen compares foreign companies to
the largest Danish manufacturing ﬁrms (ﬁrms being at least at one point in
time included in the top 100). Most likely, the top 100 ﬁrms belong to an
industrial establishment and are supported by network ties, bank relations
or government intervention. Moreover, domestic and foreign companies are
not necessarily active or successful in the same industries. As previously
noted there is substantial evidence that foreign subsidiaries cluster in cer-
tain industries where they are particularly competitive. Domestic companies
do not cluster in the same industries, which is probably no accident. First,
national clusters reﬂect the national resource mix and its historical develop-
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ment. Secondly, it is not unlikely that competition from foreign ﬁrms will
have a negative impact on the number of domestic ﬁrms and their survival.
Thus the control group that we selected is by design not representative of the
domestic ﬁrms in general. In other words, we intentionally select companies
in industries like automobiles, chemicals and electronics in which multina-
tional ﬁrms are known to be highly competitive. Therefore, the policy and
strategy conclusion is not that foreign ownership is more competitive, nor
even more modestly that foreign subsidiaries survive better than domestic
companies, but rather that foreign companies are competitive (survive bet-
ter)in the industries in which they choose to operate. It is not easy for
domestic companies to be competitive in global industries.
The limitations of our research are ﬁrst and foremost that we study a sin-
gle country, which may not be representative of large strategically important
host countries markets. In principle, however, this makes our conclusions
stand out more strongly since we would expect foreign subsidiaries to be
more tenacious in larger markets. Secondly, the long term nature of our data
implies limitations on availability, for example with regard to the nature of
exit. Since our study underlines the importance of history we cannot auto-
matically assume that end period information is valid for the entire sample.
Third, we compare foreign subsidiaries to domestic companies which tend
to be independent entities. Our study is therefore a test of the combined
eﬀect of foreignness and corporate ”subsidiarity” compared to for example
Pennings et al. (1994) who study the eﬀects of foreignness within a sample
of subsidiaries. It is possible, therefore, that the survival premium of foreign-
ness which we observe is attributable to the subsidiary status and that that
a comparison with domestically owned subsidiaries would lead to diﬀerent
results. However, we maintain that our choice of control group is relevant
for the many strategy and policy decisions which involve a choice between
foreign ownership by a multinational parent company and continuation of
the domestic company as an independent entity. In this case our results are
inconsistent which commonly held beliefs that foreign ownership is more like
to lead to closures.
The most important strategic implication may be that the survival advan-
tages of foreign subsidiaries have been reduced over time. This does not mean
that the age of the multinational company is over or anything as dramatic as
that. In fact, some of the reduction is attributable to increasing ability to ser-
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vice the domestic market by subsidiaries in other countries, which may well
imply advantages to multinationality. But it does probably imply that the
historical advantages foreign direct investment have been eroded over time
by increasing competition. It is clear that past successes do not necessarily
continue into the future, and this also applies to foreign direct investment.
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